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NO. 30 JULY 2018 Introduction 
Power in the International 
Trading System 
Trump Administration Risks Destroying World Trade Order 
Evita Schmieg 
The international trading system is in flux. A spiral of protectionism threatens to 
expose the limits of the WTO’s ability to protect against abuses and prevent trade 
wars. And the reason for this is astonishing: The US Administration believes that the 
existing rules – which the Americans themselves played a leading role in writing – 
disadvantage the United States. Currently the Trump Administration is working hard 
to dismantle the system. 
 
While there had already been protectionist 
responses to the global economic crisis 
of 2008/09, the real swell of fundamental 
criticism of global trade by populist poli-
ticians followed more recently. Today im-
ports are discussed as a threat to domestic 
employment, higher tariffs as the panacea. 
US President Donald Trump is now putting 
such policies into effect, increasing tariffs 
on products from America’s most impor-
tant trading partners, including Canada, the 
European Union and China. The latter in 
turn have retaliated with countermeasures 
of their own. The current problems expose 
weaknesses in the trade order codified in 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Pillars of the World Trade Order 
World trade is structured by three pillars 
anchored in the WTO. The “most-favoured 
nation” and “non-discrimination” prin-
ciples ensure that all imports are treated 
alike – and at the lowest tariff – at the 
border regardless of where they originate 
from. Under “national treatment” imported 
goods that have passed customs must be 
treated no worse than domestic products. 
These principles are designed to ensure 
fairness. The second pillar is progressive 
liberalisation. A succession of negotiating 
rounds since 1948 have opened up markets 
to a point where the worldwide mean tariff 
rate has fallen below 5 percent. The last 
major liberalisation round – the Uruguay 
Round – led to the founding of the WTO 
in 1995, significant market opening for 
goods, and new rules covering numerous 
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other areas. The third pillar of the trade 
system is the WTO dispute settlement pro-
cess, which has handled more than 500 
cases since 1995 and issued rulings on 
more than 350. 
How Does Power Shape the 
System? 
Many of the issues taken up in 1995, such 
as trade in services and protection of intel-
lectual property, lie in the immediate inter-
est of the OECD countries. Although China 
has become one of the most powerful 
players in world trade today – alongside 
the European Union and the United States 
– it only joined the WTO in 2001 and 
therefore played little role in creating the 
existing rules. Small and poor countries 
were also sidelined until around 2000, partly 
on account of their limited negotiating 
capacity but also because the WTO’s special 
and differential treatment for developing 
countries reduced their incentive to con-
tribute actively to shaping the system. 
In some cases these countries have been 
granted long transitional periods, in others 
they have been permitted to open their 
markets less fully or not at all. 
Ultimately these decisions have led to 
significant negative side-effects. Global 
market opening benefited above all goods 
traded between richer countries, while the 
typical products exported by poorer coun-
tries remain subject to high tariffs (agricul-
tural products, textiles, clothing). At the 
same time tariffs between developing coun-
tries are a great deal higher than those they 
impose on imports from industrialised 
countries. Within Africa the former exceed 
13 percent, whereas average tariffs on 
goods originating outside the continent 
are just under 9 percent. 
Unfair to the United States? 
Given that background it is hard to com-
prehend President Trump’s assertion that 
the United States is disadvantaged under 
the system as it stands. In the case of tariffs 
on motor vehicles, such an impression might 
be created by the difference in import 
tariffs: EU 10 percent, United States only 
2.5 percent. But in fact, the United States 
applies a tariff of 25 percent to pick-ups, 
which represent a significant share of the 
US market. A recent study by IFO-Institut 
does find that, taken as a whole, the EU’s 
tariffs are higher than those of the United 
States. But even that does not necessarily 
mean that the United States is disadvan-
taged. The current tariffs are the outcome 
of multilateral negotiations, as part of the 
package agreed internationally in 1995. In 
the last round the United States prioritised 
other issues, in particular services, where 
trade was only opened up at all in 1995. 
Washington’s great interest in trade in 
services should come as no surprise, given 
that that is what Facebook, Google and co. 
primarily produce and export. And while 
the United States in 2017 ran a deficit of 
about $150 billion in trade in goods with 
the EU, it had a surplus of roughly $50 bil-
lion in trade in services. A second example 
is offered by the WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS), which according to the 
World Bank triggered an enormous transfer 
of resources from South to North. In 2017 
the United States alone received a net $79.5 
billion from measures to protect intellectu-
al property rights (Japan second with $20.4 
billion, Germany fourth with $7.4 billion). 
In other words, the overall outcome at the 
time justified the United States accepting 
the continuation of one or other higher 
tariff line. 
Qui Bono? 
In order to properly judge who benefits 
most from the world trading system, all 
areas must thus be included. The examples 
named above illustrate the findings of 
research since the end of the WTO Uruguay 
Round: developing countries came off 
especially poorly. Not only are the goods 
produced by the world’s poorest subject 
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to the highest tariffs, but certain aspects of 
the rules also run counter to their interests. 
One prominent example of the latter is the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures, (TRIMs) which prohibits a string 
of instruments used by developing coun-
tries, such as a minimum local content 
requirement for foreign direct investments. 
Of course such instruments are not always 
economically productive, but it is sympto-
matic that those with which industrialised 
countries distort investment flows – first 
and foremost targeted subsidies – are not 
regulated. 
The mandate for the new WTO round 
that began in 2001 now placed the needs 
and interests of the developing countries 
at the centre, explicitly seeking to address 
the asymmetry between industrialised and 
developing countries. This is also reflected 
in the name: the “Doha Development 
Round”. In the meantime there has been 
enormous change in world trade and in the 
economic structures of the WTO member 
states. China has massively expanded its 
exports, as have other Asian nations. The 
developing countries’ share of world trade 
rose from 26 percent (1995) to 44 percent 
(2014). Only the world’s poorest countries 
– above all in Africa – have been unable 
to improve their situation: their share of 
world trade remains unchanged at just 
roughly 1 percent. 
It might even be true that the EU is in a 
better position than the United States under 
today’s conditions. Even that would not be 
unfair, but reason for the United States to 
seek a new round of talks in which to assert 
its current interests. 
The Question of Current 
Account Surplus 
That said, Germany’s large current account 
surplus does indeed distort the world econo-
my. But the remedy cannot be for other 
countries to restrict German exports by 
imposing tariffs. Instead Germany needs 
to increase its imports by stimulating con-
sumption and increasing investment, as 
recently reiterated by the International 
Monetary Fund. This would especially help 
Eurozone partners that find themselves un-
able to improve competitiveness by means 
of exchange rate adjustments. But instead 
the United States is currently pursuing a 
policy that is more likely to increase its 
own current account deficit: The tax reform 
benefiting middle and high incomes will 
stimulate private consumption, while infra-
structure spending will boost state con-
sumption. This will naturally also stimulate 
imports and capital inflows. In other words, 
reducing the German current account sur-
plus with the United States is not a matter 
for Germany alone. 
Trump and the Trade System 
President Trump has made it absolutely 
clear that he thinks little of multilateral 
approaches and prefers bilateral “deals”. To 
that extent there is little hope of bringing 
the Doha Round to a successful end. Nor 
can one expect the WTO to address the 
biggest current challenges in world trade 
(which are not yet at all reflected in its 
structures) such as questions of ecological 
and social sustainability or the impact of 
information technology on trade. Failure to 
supply answers to these questions will cost 
the WTO relevance, even without the kind 
of additional weakening currently wrought 
by the United States. 
The US tariff increases (where steel and 
aluminium were only the start) represent a 
challenge to the international system. The 
United States justifies them on the basis 
of the WTO’s national security exception 
(GATT Article XXI), whose relevance to the 
case at hand is doubted by many experts. 
Ultimately this will have to be decided 
through the WTO’s dispute settlement sys-
tem, which the United States is undermin-
ing by blocking the appointment of judges 
to vacant posts. As a result the legality 
of Washington’s actions may in fact go 
unclarified. More broadly, the system as a 
whole will become dysfunctional: Not only 
will it become impossible to settle individ-
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ual cases; to date dispute settlement has 
also played an important role as the central 
instrument of legal interpretation and a 
forum for developing the rules, for example 
on questions of sustainability. 
Conclusions 
A strengthened World Trade Organisation 
would be helpful for adjudicating the 
present trade conflicts and perhaps even 
launching new initiatives. One possibility 
would be to grant the WTO Secretariat the 
right to prepare its own proposals and 
present them to the member states for dis-
cussion. WTO Deputy Director-General Karl 
Brauner recently revived the idea of such 
a power of initiative in an interview. Con-
structive as it might be, it must be expected 
that the United States will block all and any 
reform proposals – especially in the pres-
ent situation. Instead the EU needs to 
actively seek out other (and new) coopera-
tion partners in order to assert its interests 
at the international level. 
The acute question for the EU is how it 
should shape its trade policy. The strategy 
of influencing the discussion in the United 
States by means of cleverly targeted retalia-
tory tariffs on products from Republican-
voting regions seems not to work in the 
current situation where facts have become 
irrelevant to political debate. Economic and 
legal considerations are apparently not (or 
no longer) sufficient for a successful trade 
policy. Nor can economic game theory offer 
much guidance, relying as it does on the 
assumption of rational behaviour. Instead 
more psychological and sociological knowl-
edge needs to be integrated into policy 
development and external trade strategy. 
There are also new challenges for diplomacy: 
exerting a moderating influence on the 
parties to economic conflicts and develop-
ing new ideas, including the question of 
what world trade issues can still be ad-
dressed jointly with the United States (con-
flicts with China spring to mind). 
Possibilities for trade policy cooperation 
with the United States should also be sought 
in other areas too. One starting point is 
offered by the US and EU bilateral free 
trade agreements with Colombia. Labour 
standards play a significant role in both (see 
SWP Comment 15/2018), but the US agree-
ment is regarded as the model. When veri-
fying implementation the EU could seek 
to cooperate more closely with the United 
States, as a means of fostering dialogue. 
Simply to concede to Trump’s demands 
for lower tariffs (for example on cars) would 
appear risky, because success would con-
firm his strategy. Additionally a bilateral 
response to US demands – aiming simply 
to contain the damage to the EU – would 
weaken the international system. It would 
be important to keep talking about possible 
strategies in the scope of the “G-6” (or at 
least of the EU) and not to allow Trump to 
play his trade partners off against each 
other. 
The EU should think seriously about a 
bilateral trade agreement with the United 
States, a “TTIP light”. Such a deal should 
not be restricted to tariffs on goods, where 
the EU has little to gain. But the current 
idea of including the topic of public pro-
curement is rejected outright by the United 
States. The search for a solution needs to 
take the current situation into account: 
This is more about damage limitation than 
actively pursuing a trade policy agenda. 
And that is liable to require the EU to make 
far-reaching compromises. 
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